In principle, market and government supervision provide alternative devices for controlling
(governing) any type of corporation. Most national governments have instituted nonmarket …

This chapter surveys the theory of optimal insurance contracts under moral hazard, revisiting
the topic in light of developments in contract theory over the past twenty-five years. Moral …

The moral hazard problem associated with deposit insurance generates the potential for
excessive risk taking on the part of bank owners. The banking literature identifies franchise …

Analysis of abnormal premium growth surrounding changes in financial strength ratings for a
large panel of property/casualty insurers generally indicates significant premium declines in …

This study examines the impact of organizational structure and board composition on risk
taking in the US property casualty insurance industry, addressing different risk‐taking …

This study identifies factors exogenous to individual insurers that are statistically related to
the overall rate of life-health insurer insolvencies. This is a departure from the …

This study provides evidence regarding the risk-subsidy and monitoring hypotheses by
investigating the relation between insider ownership and risk-taking in the property-liability …

We investigate the relationship between risk taking of life–health (LH) insurers and stability
of their institutional ownership within a simultaneous equation system model. Three main …

The importance of managerial decisions related to interest‐sensitive cash flows has
received considerable attention in the insurance literature. Consistent with the interest …

It has been long recognized that insured banks can exploit a mispriced risk-independent flat-
rate deposit insurance (DI) system by increasing leverage (ie, decreasing capital ratios) …