We study two-player common-value all-pay auctions in which the players have ex-ante
asymmetric information represented by finite connected partitions of the set of states of …

We show that under standard assumptions every member of a broad class of generalized
Tullock contests with asymmetric information has a pure strategy Bayesian Nash …

A survey on the theory of collusion under adverse selection in auctions and oligopolies Page 1
A survey on the theory of collusion under adverse selection in auctions and oligopolies Joao …

We study a class of two-player common-value all-pay auctions (contests) with asymmetric
information under the assumption that one of the players has an information advantage over …

We study the impact of an information advantage on the equilibrium payoffs and efforts in
Tullock contests where the common value of the prize and the common cost of effort are …

We show that in a common-value classic Tullock contests with incomplete information a
player's information advantage is rewarded. Interestingly, in two-player contests both players …

We show that in a common-value classic Tullock contests with incomplete information a
player's information advantage is rewarded. Interestingly, in two-player contests both players …

In games of incomplete information where each player's information is represented by a
partition of the state space, this paper presents a characterisation of monotonic models in …

On the Existence of a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in Tullock Contests with Incomplete
Information"5 Page 1 On the Existence of a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in Tullock Contests with …

Existence of Equilibrium in Tullock Contests with Incomplete Information" Page 1 Existence of
Equilibrium in Tullock Contests with Incomplete Information" E. Einy5, O. Haimanko5, D …