Rolling the dice: Recent results in probabilistic social choice

F Brandt - Trends in computational social choice, 2017 - books.google.com
When aggregating the preferences of multiple agents into one collective choice, it is easily
seen that certain cases call for randomization or other means of tiebreaking. For example, if …

[PDF][PDF] Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy

EN Zalta, U Nodelman, C Allen… - See http://plato. stanford …, 2002 - academia.edu
After an introductory section, this article will focus on four questions: How should the Kyoto
School be defined? What is meant by its central philosophical concept of “absolute …

Computer-aided methods for social choice theory

C Geist, D Peters - Trends in Computational Social Choice, 2017 - books.google.com
The Four Color Theorem is a famous early example of a mathematical result that was proven
with the help of computers. Recent advances in artificial intelligence, particularly in …

Preferences single-peaked on a circle

D Peters, M Lackner - Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2020 - jair.org
We introduce the domain of preferences that are single-peaked on a circle, which is a
generalization of the well-studied single-peaked domain. This preference restriction is …

Proportionality and strategyproofness in multiwinner elections

D Peters - arXiv preprint arXiv:2104.08594, 2021 - arxiv.org
Multiwinner voting rules can be used to select a fixed-size committee from a larger set of
candidates. We consider approval-based committee rules, which allow voters to approve or …

Minimal voting paradoxes

F Brandt, M Matthäus, C Saile - Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2022 - journals.sagepub.com
Voting paradoxes date back to the origin of social choice theory in the 18th century, when
the Chevalier de Borda pointed out that plurality—then and now the most common voting …

The Condorcet principle for multiwinner elections: From shortlisting to proportionality

H Aziz, E Elkind, P Faliszewski, M Lackner… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2017 - arxiv.org
We study two notions of stability in multiwinner elections that are based on the Condorcet
criterion. The first notion was introduced by Gehrlein: A committee is stable if each …

Proving the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness via SMT solving

F Brandl, F Brandt, M Eberl, C Geist - Journal of the ACM (JACM), 2018 - dl.acm.org
Two important requirements when aggregating the preferences of multiple agents are that
the outcome should be economically efficient and the aggregation mechanism should not be …

Finding strategyproof social choice functions via SAT solving

F Brandt, C Geist - Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2016 - jair.org
A promising direction in computational social choice is to address research problems using
computer-aided proving techniques. In particular with SAT solvers, this approach has been …

Computational social choice: The first ten years and beyond

H Aziz, F Brandt, E Elkind, P Skowron - … and Software Science: State of the …, 2019 - Springer
Computational social choice is a research area at the intersection of computer science,
mathematics, and economics that is concerned with aggregation of preferences of multiple …