Future cities promise to be more autonomous than ever, largely owing to our ability of
coordinating complex systems in real time: fleets of self-driving cars will offer on-demand …

The price of anarchy, defined as the ratio of the worst-case objective function value of a
Nash equilibrium of a game and that of an optimal outcome, quantifies the inefficiency of …

Network design is a fundamental problem for which it is important to understand the effects
of strategic behavior. Given a collection of self-interested agents who want to form a network …

We consider the price of anarchy of pure Nash equilibria in congestion games with linear
latency functions. For asymmetric games, the price of anarchy of maximum social cost is Θ …

The essence of the routing problem in real networks is that the traffic demand from a source
to destination must be satisfied by choosing a single path between source and destination …

This chapter studies the inefficiency of equilibria in noncooperative routing games, in which
selfinterested players route traffic through a congested network. Our goals are threefold: to …

We propose weakening the assumption made when studying the price of anarchy: Rather
than assume that self-interested players will play according to a Nash equilibrium (which …

A classic optimization problem in network routing is to minimize C+ D, where C is the
maximum edge congestion and D is the maximum path length (also known as dilation). The …

We consider the price of stability for Nash and correlated equilibria of linear congestion
games. The price of stability is the optimistic price of anarchy, the ratio of the cost of the best …

In machine scheduling, a set of jobs must be scheduled on a set of machines so as to
minimize some global objective function, such as the makespan, which we consider in this …