This paper surveys published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 1,040
quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary finding is that the …

Abstract Following George Stigler (1964), many economists assume that incentive problems
undermine attempts b firms to collude to raise prices and restrict output. But the potential …

Using data on prices, production, and exports, we are able to identify marginal costs as well
as the effectiveness of the Norwegian cement industry cartel. We find that our marginal cost …

This article contributes to the analysis of tacit collusion in quantity-setting supergames
involving cost-asymmetric firms. Asymmetry is dealt with by assuming that firms have a …

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10%
overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial …

The aim of this paper is to summarize the theory of (implicit) collusion in the framework of
infinitely repeated games, and in particular, to survey the comprehensive literature exploring …

The purpose of this study is to test empirically the degree of departure-time differentiation in
the Norwegian airline industry, where we observed both monopoly and duopoly routes …

We analyze roaming policy in the market for mobile telecommunications. Firms undertake
quality improving investments in network infrastructure in order to increase geographical …

An oligopoly is a market with a few sellers. 1 In today's world, oligopolies crowd most sectors
of the economy. With the exception of certain public goods subject to monopolies (for …

Competition between firms is usually the most effective way of delivering economic
efficiency and what consumers want. However, there is a balance to be struck. Firms must …