This review of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with presentation of the seminal Baron-Ferejohn model. The review then encompasses the …
The fully revised and updated new edition of this textbook continues to provide the most accessible overview of the main approaches in the study of public policy. It seeks to review …
This paper presents a political economy theory of fiscal policy. Policy choices are made by a legislature that can raise revenues via an income tax and by borrowing. Revenues can be …
JH Fiva, AH Halse - Journal of public economics, 2016 - Elsevier
Pork barrel spending is typically attributed to the strategic behavior of political elites hoping to be electorally rewarded by voters residing in their districts. Such behavior is expected to …
Do mandatory spending programs such as Medicare improve efficiency? We analyze a model with two parties allocating a fixed budget to a public good and private transfers each …
“It is the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority,” wrote Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers. The balance of power between …
HY You - The Journal of Politics, 2017 - journals.uchicago.edu
Nearly half of all lobbying activity targeting specific bills between 1998 and 2012 happened after the Congress passed legislation, yet existing theories of lobbying generally fail to …
D Diermeier, P Fong - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2011 - academic.oup.com
We present a dynamic model of legislative bargaining with an endogenously evolving default policy and a persistent agenda setter. Policy making proceeds until the agenda setter …
Formal Models of Domestic Politics offers a unified and accessible approach to canonical and important new models of politics. Intended for political science and economics students …