How effectively do democratic institutions provide public goods? Despite the incentives an
elected leader has to free ride or impose majority tyranny, our experiment demonstrates that …

Understanding the incentives of politicians requires understanding the nature of voting
behavior. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate whether voters focus on the …

Elections are thought to improve voter welfare through two channels: effective accountability
(ie, providing incentives for politicians to take costly effort) and electoral selection (ie …

In a laboratory experiment, we explore the effects of group identities on the principal‐agent
relationship between voters and representatives. In an adverse selection framework with …

We examine retrospective-and prospective-voting considerations in an experiment
implementing a simple voting model. In each period, the official chooses how much rent to …

We study the limits of dynamic electoral accountability when voters are uncertain about
politicians' characteristics (adverse selection) and their actions (moral hazard). Existing work …

When public goods are co-produced by citizens and public authorities, problems of free
riding and problems of provider accountability frequently coincide. How are voluntary …

I investigate the extent to which reputational incentives affect policy choices in the context of
a controlled laboratory experiment. In theory, asymmetric information and outcome …

We introduce a concept of accountability traps. Two conditions characterize an
accountability trap:(i) a society is caught in a self-reinforcing pattern of behavior with low …

Accountability is present in many types of social relations; for example, the accountability of
elected representatives to voters is the key characteristic of representative democracy. We …