Mechanism design with predictions

C Xu, P Lu - arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.11313, 2022 - arxiv.org
Improving algorithms via predictions is a very active research topic in recent years. This
paper initiates the systematic study of mechanism design in this model. In a number of well …

Strategyproof scheduling with predictions

E Balkanski, V Gkatzelis, X Tan - arXiv preprint arXiv:2209.04058, 2022 - arxiv.org
In their seminal paper that initiated the field of algorithmic mechanism design,\citet {NR99}
studied the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for scheduling jobs on …

[PDF][PDF] A proof of the Nisan-Ronen conjecture

G Christodoulou, E Koutsoupias, A Kovács - Proceedings of the 55th …, 2023 - dl.acm.org
A Proof of the Nisan-Ronen Conjecture Page 1 A Proof of the Nisan-Ronen Conjecture George
Christodoulou∗ Aristotle University of Thessaloniki School of Informatics and Archimedes/RC …

On the nisan-ronen conjecture

G Christodoulou, E Koutsoupias, A Kovács - ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 2022 - dl.acm.org
The Nisan-Ronen conjecture states that no truthful mechanism for makespan-minimization
when allocating m tasks to n unrelated machines can have approximation ratio less than n …

Improved lower bounds for truthful scheduling

S Dobzinski, A Shaulker - arXiv preprint arXiv:2007.04362, 2020 - arxiv.org
The problem of scheduling unrelated machines by a truthful mechanism to minimize the
makespan was introduced in the seminal" Algorithmic Mechanism Design" paper by Nisan …

The pareto frontier of inefficiency in mechanism design

A Filos-Ratsikas, Y Giannakopoulos… - Mathematics of …, 2022 - pubsonline.informs.org
We study the trade-off between the price of anarchy (PoA) and the price of stability (PoS) in
mechanism design in the prototypical problem of unrelated machine scheduling. We give …

Truthful allocation in graphs and hypergraphs

G Christodoulou, E Koutsoupias, A Kovács - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2021 - arxiv.org
We study truthful mechanisms for allocation problems in graphs, both for the minimization
(ie, scheduling) and maximization (ie, auctions) setting. The minimization problem is a …

On scheduling mechanisms beyond the worst case

Y Gao, J Zhang - Algorithmica, 2024 - Springer
The problem of scheduling unrelated machines has been studied since the inception of
algorithmic mechanism design (Nisan and Ronen, Algorithmic mechanism design (extended …

The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions

M Joswig, M Klimm, S Spitz - Mathematical Programming, 2024 - Springer
The difference set of an outcome in an auction is the set of types that the auction mechanism
maps to the outcome. We give a complete characterization of the geometry of the difference …

A Proof of the Nisan-Ronen Conjecture---An Overview

G Christodoulou, E Koutsoupias, A Kovacs - ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 2024 - dl.acm.org
This note presents an overview of our recent publication, which validates a conjecture
proposed by Nisan and Ronen in their seminal paper [Nisan and Ronen 2001]. We show …