In their seminal paper that initiated the field of algorithmic mechanism design,\citet {NR99} studied the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for scheduling jobs on …
A Proof of the Nisan-Ronen Conjecture Page 1 A Proof of the Nisan-Ronen Conjecture George Christodoulou∗ Aristotle University of Thessaloniki School of Informatics and Archimedes/RC …
The Nisan-Ronen conjecture states that no truthful mechanism for makespan-minimization when allocating m tasks to n unrelated machines can have approximation ratio less than n …
S Dobzinski, A Shaulker - arXiv preprint arXiv:2007.04362, 2020 - arxiv.org
The problem of scheduling unrelated machines by a truthful mechanism to minimize the makespan was introduced in the seminal" Algorithmic Mechanism Design" paper by Nisan …
We study the trade-off between the price of anarchy (PoA) and the price of stability (PoS) in mechanism design in the prototypical problem of unrelated machine scheduling. We give …
We study truthful mechanisms for allocation problems in graphs, both for the minimization (ie, scheduling) and maximization (ie, auctions) setting. The minimization problem is a …
The problem of scheduling unrelated machines has been studied since the inception of algorithmic mechanism design (Nisan and Ronen, Algorithmic mechanism design (extended …
M Joswig, M Klimm, S Spitz - Mathematical Programming, 2024 - Springer
The difference set of an outcome in an auction is the set of types that the auction mechanism maps to the outcome. We give a complete characterization of the geometry of the difference …
This note presents an overview of our recent publication, which validates a conjecture proposed by Nisan and Ronen in their seminal paper [Nisan and Ronen 2001]. We show …