Abstract The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies that all anonymous, Pareto-optimal, and
single-valued social choice functions can be strategically manipulated. In this paper, we …

Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the ordinal preferences of voters over multiple
alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. To study the axiomatic …

An important--but very demanding--property in collective decision-making is
strategyproofness, which requires that voters cannot benefit from submitting insincere …

We investigate a specific type of group manipulation in two-tier elections, which involves
pairs of voters agreeing to exchange their votes. Two-tier elections are modeled as a two …

ABSTRACT A fundamental requirement in social choice theory is non-manipulability, ie,
voters should not be able to benefit by voting dishonestly. Unfortunately, a seminal result by …

This thesis examines strategic manipulation in three areas of social choice theory-single-
winner voting, multiwinner voting, and judgment aggregation. It is widely accepted that …

Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the ordinal preferences of voters over multiple
alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. To study the axiomatic …

Coalition formation and Schelling segregation are important scenarios in algorithmic game
theory. While the former considers the strategic behavior of agents gathering in coalitions …

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies that all anonymous, Paretooptimal, and single-
valued social choice functions can be strategically manipulated. In this paper, we investigate …