The main purpose of this paper is to present an analytical framework that can be used to
study rationalizable strategic behavior in general situations—ie, arbitrary strategic games …

We study agents whose expected utility preferences are interdependent for informational or
psychological reasons. We characterize when two types can be “strategically distinguished” …

We study the use of mixed strategies in games by ambiguity averse agents with a preference
for randomization. Applying the decision theoretic model of Saito (2015) to games, we …

This paper characterizes both point-rationalizability and rationalizability in large games
when societal responses are formulated as distributions or averages of individual actions …

We introduce a game in preference form, which consists of a game form and a preference
structure, and define preference rationalizability that allows for each player's ex-post …

We find that, for sufficiently risk-averse agents, strict dominance by pure or mixed actions
coincides with dominance by pure actions in the sense of (Börgers in Econometrica 61 (2) …

We study the risk index of an additive gamble proposed in Aumann and Serrano (J Political
Econ 116 (5): 810–836, 2008). We establish a generalized duality result for this index and …

In this paper, we detect meaningful properties of choice rules ensuring that the solution
generated by iterated application of choice rules specifies the strategy profiles that might be …

We consider finite games in strategic form with Choquet expected utility. Using the notion of
(unambiguously) believed, we define Choquet rationalizability and characterize it by …

The present dissertation consists of three independent essays on Game Theory and its
applications to Economics. The first essay compares two standard notions of rational choice …