Subsidized health insurance markets use diagnosis-based risk adjustment to induce
insurers to offer an equitable benefit to individuals of varying expected cost. I demonstrate …

This paper introduces a tractable model of health insurance with both moral hazard and
adverse selection. We show that government sponsored universal basic insurance should …

In a model where patients face budget constraints that make some treatments unaffordable
without health insurance, we ask which treatments should be covered by universal basic …

In many federally-subsidized insurance markets, insurers are subsidized on the basis of
enrollee characteristics; in principle, subsidies that are “risk adjusted” in this way …

This paper aims to identify selection separately from moral hazard in a mandatory health
insurance market where enrollees can freely choose their deductible scheme. The empirical …

We analyze a model of optimal risk adjustment in competitive health-insurance markets
which suffer from both ex-ante adverse selection and ex-post moral hazard. We find, firstly …

Zorgverzekeraars onderhandelen met zorgaanbieders over de prijs en kwaliteit van zorg en
sluiten hierover contracten af. Maar voor niet-gecontracteerde zorg moeten verzekeraars …

Most competitive social health insurance markets include risk equalization to compensate
insurers for predictable variation in healthcare expenses. Empirical literature shows that …

We analyze optimal risk adjustment in competitive health-insurance markets when insurers
have better information on their customers' risk profiles than the sponsor of health insurance …

This paper analyzes optimal risk adjustment for direct risk selection (DRS). Integrating
insurers activities for risk selection into a discrete choice model of individuals' health …