We present a survey of the emerging literature on the design of matching markets. We
survey the articles on discrete resource allocation problems, their solutions, and their …

Most algorithmic matches in fielded kidney exchanges do not result in an actual transplant.
In this paper, we address the problem of cycles and chains in a proposed match failing after …

THE National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 makes it illegal to buy or sell a kidney in the US,
thus making donation the only viable option for kidney transplantation. A transplanted kidney …

Balancing fairness and efficiency in resource allocation is a classical economic and
computational problem. The price of fairness measures the worst-case loss of economic …

Although a pilot national live-donor kidney exchange program was recently launched in the
US, the kidney shortage is increasing faster than ever. A new solution paradigm is able to …

Ridesharing has emerged as an alternative transportation mode along road networks
around the world. Rideshare matching problem is vital to improve the sustainable …

We revisit the pairwise kidney exchange problem established by Roth Sonmez and Unver
[23]. Our goal, explained in terms of graph theory, is to find a maximum fractional matching …

Abstract We consider a Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) model in which patients' preferences
are restricted so that patients prefer kidneys from compatible younger donors to kidneys from …

Patients with end-stage renal failure often find kidney donors who are willing to donate a life-
saving kidney, but who are medically incompatible with the patients. Kidney exchanges are …

Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) programs solve incompatibility problems of donor–patient
pairs in living donor kidney transplantation by arranging exchanges of donors among …