We study voting rules for participatory budgeting, where a group of voters collectively
decides which projects should be funded using a common budget. We allow the projects to …

From fundamental concepts and results to recent advances in computational social choice,
this open access book provides a thorough and in-depth look at multi-winner voting based …

In this survey, we review the literature investigating participatory budgeting as a social
choice problem. Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a democratic process in which citizens are …

We consider approval-based committee voting, ie the setting where each voter approves a
subset of candidates, and these votes are then used to select a fixed-size set of winners …

We study two influential voting rules proposed in the 1890s by Phragmen and Thiele, which
elect a committee of k candidates which proportionally represents the voters. Voters provide …

In this paper we describe the design components of the heterogenous multi-chain protocol
Polkadot and explain how these components help Polkadot address some of the existing …

The ability to measure the satisfaction of (groups of) voters is a crucial prerequisite for
formulating proportionality axioms in approval-based participatory budgeting elections. Two …

We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible public goods. We model the public
goods as elements with feasibility constraints on what subsets of elements can be chosen …

A voting rule decides on a probability distribution over a set of m alternatives, based on
rankings of those alternatives provided by agents. We assume that agents have cardinal …

When selecting a subset of candidates (a so-called committee) based on the preferences of
voters, proportional representation is often a major desideratum. When going beyond …