This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We
start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and …

We develop a property‐rights model of the firm in which production entails a continuum of
uniquely sequenced stages. In each stage, a final‐good producer contracts with a distinct …

This article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation, bringing
them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general-interest reader …

A principal incentivizes a team of agents to work by privately offering them bonuses
contingent on team success. We study the principal's optimal incentive scheme that …

We model situations in which a principal offers contracts to a group of agents to participate in
a project. Agents' benefits from participation depend on the identity of other participating …

Recent theory suggests that firms incorporate synergistic interrelationships among
executives into optimal incentive design. We focus on Pay Performance Sensitivities (PPS) …

This paper examines the impact of production network economies on designing cost-
effective conservation targeting strategies. We first develop a theoretical model to study the …

A principal incentivizes a group of agents to work by choosing a monitoring structure and a
scheme of performance-contingent rewards. The monitoring structure partitions the set of …

We consider a repeated moral hazard problem where both the principal and the wealth‐
constrained agent are risk‐neutral. In each of two periods, the agent can exert unobservable …

This article studies the effect of transparency among peers on the principal's cost of
providing incentives. Using directed graphs to represent peer information, we show that …