Over ten years of a debate about the best ways to make banks safer have led to the
conclusion that improving their risk culture is one venue to achieve this goal. Consequently …

Abstract Research Question/Issue The desire to structure bankers' remuneration in a way
that it is risk sensitive and aligned with the long‐term incentives of their institutions was at …

This paper assesses whether compensation practices for bank Chief Executive Officers
(CEOs) changed after the Financial Stability Board (FSB) issued post-crisis guidelines on …

The regulation that caps executives' variable compensation, as part of the Capital
Requirements Directive IV of 2013, likely affected executive turnover, compensation design …

We examine whether the relationship between managerial risk-taking incentives and bank
risk is sensitive to the underlying macroeconomic conditions. We find that risk-taking …

We present an equilibrium model of financial institutions to examine the optimal regulation of
risk taking. Shareholders provide incentives for management to increase risk to excessive …

We investigate the (unintended) effects of bank executive compensation regulation. Capping
the share of variable compensation spurred average turnover rates driven by CEOs at poorly …

The present paper is designed to examine the extent of the Chief Executive Officer's (CEO)
behavioral impact on the bank risk-taking venture. The sample involves a set of 540 banks …

This study examines how regulatory policy impacts the complex relationship between bank
risk-taking and the predicted probability of a systemic banking crisis in 54 African countries …

This study focuses on the management financial incentives that banking institutions adopt,
with the purpose of best serving their corporate strategies. Specifically, a comparative study …