[HTML][HTML] Reasons for action: Internal vs. external

S Finlay, M Schroeder - 2008 - plato.stanford.edu
Often, when there is a reason for you to do something, it is the kind of thing to motivate you to
do it. For example, if Max and Caroline are deciding whether to go to the Alcove for dinner …

The normativity of what we care about: a love-based theory of practical reasons

K Schaubroeck - The Normativity of What We Care About, 2013 - torrossa.com
This monograph has evolved out of my doctoral research at the University of Leuven. I
defended my dissertation in 2008, and I have long been reluctant to publish any of it …

[PDF][PDF] Practical reasons

CE Mason - 2012 - ir.canterbury.ac.nz
Normal human limitations mean that when people decide how to act, they often have to base
their decisions on flawed information or reasoning. Even when agents reason to the best of …

Reasons of justice: objectivity as trans-positionality

DNR Carneiro - 2021 - wrap.warwick.ac.uk
What is it to be objective in our evaluations of claims of social justice? What should be that
standard that determines what is the correct use of reason regarding what is just? As an …

[图书][B] Actions, reasons and self-expression: A defense of subjectivist-internalism about reasons

C Plunkett - 2016 - search.proquest.com
The central question of my dissertation is: what makes it the case that certain considerations
are reasons for acting? This is a question about the truth-makers of claims about reasons …

Internalism About Practical Reasons

R Compaijen, R Compaijen - … , MacIntyre, Williams, and the Internal Point …, 2018 - Springer
Abstract This chapter places Alasdair MacIntyre's account of practical reasons in the wider
context of the contemporary metaethical debate on reasons for action. It explores the key …

Subjective normativity: Understanding reasons and 'oughts' as contingent on desires

E Ventham - 2018 - eprints.soton.ac.uk
This thesis argues that what an agent has reason to do, and what an agent ought to do, are
contingent on that agent's desires. Unless that agent has some desire that could be satisfied …