We explore the acquisition and flow of information in matching markets through a model of
college admissions with endogenous costly information acquisition. We extend the notion of …

We propose a criterion of stability for two-sided markets with asymmetric information. A
central idea is to formulate off-path beliefs conditional on counterfactual pairwise deviations …

Firms seeking business partners and individuals seeking life partners face several
challenges in addition to finding available candidates. One of these challenges is …

A standing question in the theory of matching markets is how to define stability under
incomplete information. This paper proposes an epistemic approach. Agents negotiate …

We show how fragile stable matchings are in a decentralized one-to-one matching setting.
The classical work of Roth and Vande Vate (1990) suggests simple decentralized dynamics …

We provide a framework for studying two-sided matching markets with incomplete
information. The framework accommodates two-sided incomplete information as well as …

We consider a many-to-one matching market where colleges share true preferences over
students but make decisions using only independent noisy rankings. Each student has a …

We experimentally study decentralized one-to-one matching markets with transfers. We vary
the information available to participants, complete or incomplete, and the surplus structure …

Matching platforms not only mediate matches but also work as information gatekeepers.
When users with private tastes use such a platform to find a partner, the platform asks them …

We propose a new criterion for stability of two-sided matching markets with asymmetric
information. The criterion requires the Bayesian consistency of three probabilistic beliefs …