SH Chew, JS Sagi - Journal of Economic Theory, 2012 - Elsevier
Few papers in the literature on inequality measurement deal with uncertainty, particularly when the ranking of cohorts may not be fixed. We present a set of axioms implying such a …
The recent development of computational methods in repeated games has made it possible to study the properties of subgame-perfect equilibria in more detail. This paper shows that …
This paper examines how to construct subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted repeated games with perfect monitoring. We introduce a relatively simple class …
This paper develops a positive theory of informal justice based on social preferences. We consider a principal and an agent whose relationship is mediated by a third-party arbitrator …
Raiffa (1961) criticizes ambiguity-averse preferences by claiming that hedging is possible with randomization of choices. We argue that the timing of randomization is crucial for …
This paper presents a method for computing the minimum purestrategy subgame-perfect equilibrium payoffs in repeated games. These optimal punishments play an important role …
In the first chapter I discuss how OPEC's internal costs restrict their ability collude. Where membership in 2007 was anchored by three large, low-cost producers in Iran, Venezuela …
S Chassang, C Zehnder - Economic Theory Center Working Paper, 2014 - papers.ssrn.com
This paper develops a novel positive model of informal contracting in which rewards and punishments are not determined by an ex ante optimal plan but instead express the ex post …