This chapter studies how incomplete information helps accommodate frictions in
coordination, leading to novel insights on the joint determination of expectations and …

Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among
players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be …

In models where privately informed agents interact, they may need to form higher-order
expectations, ie expectations about other agents' expectations. In this paper we prove that …

A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the
process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages lead to outcomes that agree …

Abstract [This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory. org/] In
games with incomplete information, conventional hierarchies of belief are incomplete as …

The mental attitudes of belief, desire, and intention play a central role in the design and
implementation of autonomous agents. In 1987, Bratman proposed their integration into a …

We study a one‐sided offers bargaining game in which the buyer has private information
about the value of the object and the seller has private information about his beliefs about …

We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who
share a common prior regarding a binary state and who observe some information structure …

We show that the equilibrium policy rule in beauty contest models is equivalent to that of a
single agent's forecast of the economic fundamental. This forecast is conditional on a …

In coordination games and speculative over-the-counter financial markets, solutions depend
on higher-order average expectations: agents' expectations about what counterparties, on …