We study contests in which contestants are homogeneous and have convex effort costs.
Increasing contest competitiveness, by making prizes more unequal, scaling up the …

Many sales, sports, and research contests are put in place to maximize contestants'
performance. We investigate and provide a complete characterization of the prize structures …

We investigate which form of corporate culture is most effective in enhancing individual
performance in creative tasks conducted in group settings. We combine a series of …

We study a contest problem in which two players compete on a continuum of battlefields by
spending resources subject to some constraints on their strategies. Following Myerson …

We study a contest design problem in which a designer chooses how many Tullock contests
to have, how much to award to each contest, and which contestants (of high or low type) …

We study two-sided matching contests with two sets, A and B, each of which includes a finite
number of heterogeneous agents with commonly known types. The agents in each set …

We study the classical contest design problem of allocating a budget across different prizes
to maximize effort in a finite type-space environment. For any contest, we characterize the …

Empirical results show that the introduction of a superstar—an opponent with relatively high
ability—into a contest may have opposite effects: sometimes it increases other participants' …

We study complete information all-pay contests with n players and two heterogeneous
prizes with distinct values. Among the players, n− 1 are symmetric (ie, they evaluate the …

This paper considers a planner who can group participants into different competitions for
performance ranking and design prize structure in each competition in order to maximize the …