Economic policy is modelled as the outcome of a (political) game between two interest
groups. The possible ex-post (realized) outcomes in the game correspond to the proposed …

We experimentally test a rent seeking model under five levels of competition. At one
extreme, a subject's probability of winning a prize is equal to her share of the total …

Most human societies are characterized by the presence of different identity groups which
cooperate but also compete for resources and power. To deepen our understanding of the …

We incorporate policymaker costs of supplying rents and variable intensities of competition
among rent seekers into the standard rent‐seeking game. By incorporating these aspects …

How do firms allocate their lobbying resources among their political goals? The authors
approach this question using a game-theoretic model that integrates three concepts from the …

The article presents multilevel game theory, as a generalization of conventional single-level
game theory as it has developed since von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). We define a …

In this paper, a dynamic rent‐seeking game incorporating policymaker cost and competition
intensity is considered. On the basis of the political environment and rent‐seekers with …

In game theory, there is a fundamental distinction between simultaneous-move games and
sequential-move games. While in the former no knowledge of the strategies chosen by other …

Лоббирование как одна из наиболее апробированных и действенных форм в
обеспечении внеэлекторального взаимодействия граждан с органами публичной …

The influence of lobbying activity on economic growth and welfare is widely observed in the
literature. Many scholars consider lobbying as a sort of rent-seeking and blame it for non …