There is an increasing amount of empirical work investigating the sense of agency, ie the
registration that we are the initiators of our own actions. Many studies try to relate the sense …

Recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of action have considerably enlarged our
understanding of human motor cognition. In particular, the activity of the mirror system, first …

In The Unity of Consciousness Tim Bayne draws on philosophy, psychology, and
neuroscience in defence of the claim that consciousness is unified. In the first part of the …

After a long period of neglect, the phenomenology of action has recently regained its place
in the agenda of philosophers and scientists alike. The recent explosion of interest in the …

Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the
purposiveness of action? Standard accounts of action assign a role to intention but are silent …

In this chapter, I shall offer a sketch of a dynamic theory of intentions. I shall argue that
several categories or forms of intentions should be distinguished based on their different …

Sense of agency refers to the feeling of controlling one's own actions, and, through these
actions, events in the outside world. Sense of agency is widely held to involve a …

Social neuroscience provides insights into the neural correlates of the human capacity to
explain and predict other people's intentions, a capacity that lies at the core of the Theory of …

The now growing literature on the content and sources of the phenomenology of first-person
agency highlights the multi-faceted character of the phenomenology of agency and makes it …

Drawing on the latest work in cognitive neuroscience, a philosopher proposes that delusions
are narrative models that accommodate anomalous experiences. In The Measure of …