This paper argues that central bankers should temporarily raise inflation when anticipating
liquidity traps to ensure the credibility of otherwise time-inconsistent forward guidance …

We develop a numerical method for computing all pure strategy subgame-perfect
equilibrium values of dynamic strategic games with discrete states and actions. We define a …

This paper studies incomplete information games where players observe only a summary
statistic of the history, including reputation games as a special case. A recursive …

In this chapter, we survey how the methods of dynamic and stochastic games have been
applied in macroeconomic research. In our discussion of methods for constructing dynamic …

In this paper, I use a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm to estimate a model of private‐
sector behavior that does not feature private‐sector knowledge of the monetary …

This paper studies an infinite horizon adverse selection model with an underlying Markov
information process. It introduces a graphic representation of continuation contracts and …

This paper introduces conditional Markov strategies in discrete-time discounted dynamic
games with perfect monitoring. These are strategies in which players follow Markov policies …

We study the optimal design of a disinflation plan by a planner who lacks commitment.
Having announced a plan, the Central banker faces a tradeoff between surprise inflation …

We study the optimal design of inflation targets by a planner who lacks commitment and
exerts imperfect control over inflation. The government's reputation for being committed …

We propose first a static and then a dynamic infinite-horizon model of the financial advisory
market and show how to compute equilibrium solutions. Unregulated, market features are …