Bank failures caused by Large withdrawals: An explanation based purely on liquidity
G Carmona - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2007 - Elsevier
In a version of the Diamond and Dybvig [Diamond, D., Dybvig, P., 1983. Bank runs, deposit
insurance, and liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 91, 401–419.] model with aggregate …
insurance, and liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 91, 401–419.] model with aggregate …
[PDF][PDF] Nash and limit equilibria of games with a continuum of players
G Carmona - Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2003 - Citeseer
We show that a strategy is a Nash equilibrium in a game with a continuum of players if and
only if there exists a sequence of finite games such that its restriction is an εn-equilibria, with …
only if there exists a sequence of finite games such that its restriction is an εn-equilibria, with …
On the existence of equilibrium bank runs in a Diamond-Dybvig environment
G Carmona - 2004 - papers.ssrn.com
In a version of the Diamond and Dybvig [6] model with aggregate uncertainty, we show that
there exists an equilibrium with the following properties: all consumers deposit at the bank …
there exists an equilibrium with the following properties: all consumers deposit at the bank …
A strong anti-folk theorem
G Carmona - International Journal of Game Theory, 2006 - Springer
We study the properties of finitely complex, symmetric, globally stable, and semi-perfect
equilibria. We show that:(1) If a strategy satisfies these properties then players play a Nash …
equilibria. We show that:(1) If a strategy satisfies these properties then players play a Nash …
A re-interpretation of the concept of nash equilibrium based on the notion of social institutions
G Carmona - 2003 - papers.ssrn.com
We define social institutions as strategies in some repeated game. With this interpretation in
mind, we consider the impact of introducing requirements on strategies which have been …
mind, we consider the impact of introducing requirements on strategies which have been …