We derive an optimal dynamic contest for environments where effort can be monitored only through a coarse, binary performance measure and the principal chooses prize-allocation …
We consider the design of contests when the principal can choose both the prize profile and how the prizes are allocated as a function of a possibly noisy signal about the agents' efforts …
We consider the design of contests for n agents when the principal can choose both the prize profile and the contest success function. Our framework includes Tullock contests …
B Chen, B Chen, D Knyazev - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2022 - Wiley Online Library
We study information disclosure in a dynamic multi‐agent research contest, where each agent privately searches for innovations and submits his best to compete for a winner‐takes …
We study contests with technological uncertainty, where contestants can invest in different technologies of uncertain value. The principal, who is also uncertain about the value of the …
We study project development and selection by an organization whose members prefer different projects. The organization faces a basic trade-off between fostering collaboration …
T Durandard - arXiv preprint arXiv:2308.05668, 2023 - arxiv.org
I study how organizations assign tasks to identify the best candidate to promote among a pool of workers. Task allocation and workers' motivation interact through the organization's …
Z Chen, Y Liu - arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.02756, 2024 - arxiv.org
This paper proposes a dynamic research contest, namely the chasing contest, in which two asymmetric contestants exert costly effort to accomplish two breakthroughs in a continuous …
This paper explores the design of an R&D contest by a sponsor who can charge entry fees and allocate a fixed amount of productive resources across firms. We characterize the …