This article summarizes and draws connections among diverse streams of theoretical and
empirical research on the economics of privacy. We focus on the economic value and …

“An extraordinarily good synthesis from an amazing range of philosophical, legal, and
technological sources... the book will appeal to legal academics and students, lawyers …

I study a mechanism design problem in which a designer allocates a single good to one of
several agents, and the mechanism is followed by an aftermarket—a post‐mechanism game …

A seller has an uncertain number of perishable goods to sell in each period. Privately
informed buyers arrive stochastically to the market. Buyers are risk neutral, patient, and have …

We provide tools to analyze information design problems subject to constraints. We do so by
extending an insight by Le Treust and Tomala to the case of multiple inequality and equality …

We extend five principles of tax incidence under perfect competition to a general model of
imperfect competition. The principles cover 1) the independence of physical and economic …

The provision of public goods under asymmetric information has most often been viewed as
a mechanism design problem under the aegis of an uninformed mediator. This paper …

I study a Bayesian persuasion model in which multiple senders sequentially persuade one
receiver, after observing signal structures of prior senders and their realizations. I develop a …

Artificial agents, and the contracts they make, are ubiquitous. Every time we interact with a
shopping website, we interact with a more or less autonomous artificial agent that queries …

The common agency model is among the most productive economic frameworks of recent
times, generating important results in the analysis of political influence, industrial …