A decision maker needs to reach a decision and relies on an expert to acquire information.
Ideal actions of expert and decision maker are partially aligned and the expert chooses what …

This paper characterizes optimal mediation in sender-receiver games. We assume that the
mediator's objective is to maximize the ex-ante welfare of the sender. Mediated equilibria …

Network typology largely affects the evolutionary dynamics of collective behaviors in many
real-world complex systems. As a conventional transmission model, the sender–receiver …

This paper characterizes optimal communication equilibria (which models mediation) in
sender-receiver games. We assume that communication devices are designed to maximize …

We investigate how prior-biased inferences change players' strategic incentives and result
in novel welfare implications in the canonical framework of strategic information …

I analyze a problem of project selection where two agents, privately informed of both the true
value and their bias in favor of their alternatives, make non-verifiable proposals to an …

This paper investigates mediated communication between an informed sender and an
uninformed receiver with conflicting preferences in the framework of Crawford and Sobel …

This paper analyzes concurrent versus sequential decision-making in a model where two
units first communicate and then make decisions, attempting to both adapt to their local …

We perform distributional comparative statics in a cheap talk model of adaptation. Receiver
borne adaptation costs drive a wedge between the objectives of sender and receiver that is …

The paper studies a dynamic communication game in the presence of adverse selection and
career concerns. A forecaster of privately known competence, who cares about his …