Participation and duration of environmental agreements
M Battaglini, B Harstad - Journal of Political Economy, 2016 - journals.uchicago.edu
We analyze participation in international environmental agreements in a dynamic game in
which countries pollute and invest in green technologies. If complete contracts are feasible …
which countries pollute and invest in green technologies. If complete contracts are feasible …
Game theoretic research on the design of international environmental agreements: insights, critical remarks, and future challenges
M Finus - International Review of environmental and resource …, 2008 - dspace.stir.ac.uk
In recent years, the number of publications that analyze the formation and stability of
international environmental agreements (IEAs) using the method of game theory has sharply …
international environmental agreements (IEAs) using the method of game theory has sharply …
Dynamic games in the economics and management of pollution
S Jørgensen, G Martín-Herrán, G Zaccour - Environmental Modeling & …, 2010 - Springer
Dynamic Games in the Economics and Management of Pollution | Environmental Modeling &
Assessment Skip to main content SpringerLink Account Menu Find a journal Publish with us …
Assessment Skip to main content SpringerLink Account Menu Find a journal Publish with us …
Optimal transfers and participation decisions in international environmental agreements
The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers
play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements. However, the …
play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements. However, the …
碳减排“时-空-效-益” 统筹理论: Ⅱ. 空间统筹
魏一鸣， 韩融， 陈炜明 - 北京理工大学学报(社会科学版), 2024 - journal.bit.edu.cn
《 联合国气候变化框架公约》(UNFCCC) 倡导缔约方承担“共同但有区别” 的减排责任,
指出“各缔约方应当在公平的基础上, 根据它们共同但有区别的责任和各自的能力 …
指出“各缔约方应当在公平的基础上, 根据它们共同但有区别的责任和各自的能力 …
Stability of climate coalitions in a cartel formation game
This paper analyses the formation and stability of coalitions to form international
environmental agreements. We present and apply the Stability of coalitions model to assess …
environmental agreements. We present and apply the Stability of coalitions model to assess …
A cooperative differential game of transboundary industrial pollution between two regions
X Huang, P He, W Zhang - Journal of Cleaner Production, 2016 - Elsevier
In recent years, the transboundary pollution problems in the world are becoming more and
more serious. The diffusion of pollutants is common, and each region which suffers from the …
more serious. The diffusion of pollutants is common, and each region which suffers from the …
Providing public goods in the absence of strong institutions
A Gerber, PC Wichardt - Journal of Public Economics, 2009 - Elsevier
This paper proposes a simple two-stage mechanism to establish positive contributions to
public goods in the absence of powerful institutions to provide the public good and to …
public goods in the absence of powerful institutions to provide the public good and to …
The impact of surplus sharing on the stability of international climate agreements
HP Weikard, M Finus… - Oxford Economic …, 2006 - academic.oup.com
This paper analyses stability of coalitions for greenhouse gas abatement under different
sharing rules applied to the gains from cooperation. We use a 12-region model to examine …
sharing rules applied to the gains from cooperation. We use a 12-region model to examine …
Incentives and stability of international climate coalitions: An integrated assessment
This paper analyses the incentives to participate in an international climate agreement and
the stability of the resulting climate coalition using the integrated assessment model WITCH …
the stability of the resulting climate coalition using the integrated assessment model WITCH …