Who voted for Brexit? A comprehensive district-level analysis

SO Becker, T Fetzer, D Novy - Economic Policy, 2017 - academic.oup.com
SUMMARY On 23 June 2016, the British electorate voted to leave the European Union (EU).
We analyse vote and turnout shares across 380 local authority areas in the United Kingdom …

Adverse selection in distributive politics

SN Ali, M Mihm, L Siga - Available at SSRN 3579095, 2018 - papers.ssrn.com
Many policy reforms involve gains for some voters at a cost borne by others, and voters may
be asymmetrically informed about who gains and loses. This paper shows that the …

Full information equivalence in large elections

P Barelli, S Bhattacharya, L Siga - Econometrica, 2022 - Wiley Online Library
We study the problem of aggregating private information in elections with two or more
alternatives for a large family of scoring rules. We introduce a feasibility condition, the linear …

Manipulated electorates and information aggregation

M Ekmekci, S Lauermann - The Review of Economic Studies, 2020 - academic.oup.com
We study the aggregation of dispersed information in elections in which turnout may depend
on the state. State-dependent turnout may arise from the actions of a biased and informed …

The perverse politics of polarization

SN Ali, M Mihm, L Siga - Available at SSRN 2907489, 2017 - papers.ssrn.com
Many policies, such as trade and immigration, bear important consequences for both the
size and distribution of surplus. Oftentimes, people are asked to vote on these policies …

Information aggregation in Poisson elections

M Ekmekci, S Lauermann - Theoretical Economics, 2022 - Wiley Online Library
The modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, when voters have
common interests, elections will aggregate information when the population is large, in any …

Voting on tricky questions

T Tajika - Games and Economic Behavior, 2022 - Elsevier
We study a common-value voting model, in which private signal is typically informative but
may be unreliable. Reliability determines the precision and the meaning of voters' private …

Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting

T Tajika - Social Choice and Welfare, 2021 - Springer
We study a model of two-candidate electoral competition. In our model, each voter has
single-peaked preferences for the consequences of policies, but voters receive only partial …

[PDF][PDF] Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation and electoral incentives

C Prato, S Wolton - SSRN: https://ssrn. com/abstract, 2017 - marina-azzimonti.com
Elections have long been understood as a mean to encourage candidates to act in voters'
interest, as well as a way to aggregate dispersed information. This paper juxtaposes these …

Collective mistake in a tricky question under strategic voting

T Tajika - Available at SSRN 3224990, 2019 - papers.ssrn.com
We consider a common-value voting in which the state of the nature is a pair of payoff-
relevant state and a variable that determines the precision and the meaning of voters' private …