[HTML][HTML] Open RAN security: Challenges and opportunities

M Liyanage, A Braeken, S Shahabuddin… - Journal of Network and …, 2023 - Elsevier
Abstract Open RAN (ORAN, O-RAN) represents a novel industry-level standard for RAN
(Radio Access Network), which defines interfaces that support inter-operation between …

Technical privacy metrics: a systematic survey

I Wagner, D Eckhoff - ACM Computing Surveys (Csur), 2018 - dl.acm.org
The goal of privacy metrics is to measure the degree of privacy enjoyed by users in a system
and the amount of protection offered by privacy-enhancing technologies. In this way, privacy …

[PDF][PDF] Tor: The second-generation onion router.

R Dingledine, N Mathewson… - USENIX security …, 2004 - css.csail.mit.edu
We present Tor, a circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication service. This
second-generation Onion Routing system addresses limitations in the original design by …

{RAPTOR}: Routing attacks on privacy in tor

Y Sun, A Edmundson, L Vanbever, O Li… - 24th USENIX Security …, 2015 - usenix.org
The Tor network is a widely used system for anonymous communication. However, Tor is
known to be vulnerable to attackers who can observe traffic at both ends of the …

Trawling for tor hidden services: Detection, measurement, deanonymization

A Biryukov, I Pustogarov… - 2013 IEEE Symposium …, 2013 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Tor is the most popular volunteer-based anonymity network consisting of over 3000
volunteer-operated relays. Apart from making connections to servers hard to trace to their …

Inferring the source of encrypted HTTP connections

M Liberatore, BN Levine - Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on …, 2006 - dl.acm.org
We examine the effectiveness of two traffic analysis techniques for identifying encrypted
HTTP streams. The techniques are based upon classification algorithms, identifying …

Locating hidden servers

L Overlier, P Syverson - 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and …, 2006 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Hidden services were deployed on the Tor anonymous communication network in 2004.
Announced properties include server resistance to distributed DoS. Both the EFF and …

Timing attacks in low-latency mix systems

BN Levine, MK Reiter, C Wang, M Wright - … , FC 2004, Key West, FL, USA …, 2004 - Springer
A mix is a communication proxy that attempts to hide the correspondence between its
incoming and outgoing messages. Timing attacks are a significant challenge for mix-based …

Privacy vulnerabilities in encrypted HTTP streams

GD Bissias, M Liberatore, D Jensen… - … Workshop, PET 2005 …, 2006 - Springer
Encrypting traffic does not prevent an attacker from performing some types of traffic analysis.
We present a straightforward traffic analysis attack against encrypted HTTP streams that is …

How much anonymity does network latency leak?

N Hopper, EY Vasserman, E Chan-Tin - ACM Transactions on …, 2010 - dl.acm.org
Low-latency anonymity systems such as Tor, AN. ON, Crowds, and Anonymizer. com aim to
provide anonymous connections that are both untraceable by “local” adversaries who …