ProVerif is an automatic symbolic protocol verifier. It supports a wide range of cryptographic
primitives, defined by rewrite rules or by equations. It can prove various security properties …

The abstraction of cryptographic operations by term algebras, called Dolev–Yao models, is
essential in almost all tool-supported methods for proving security protocols. Recently …

We outline a novel approach for formally verifying zero-knowledge protocols building on
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) as an abstract semantics for a low-level protocol …

With most of our everyday life taking place online–from private conversations in messaging
applications to financial transactions even being published on a public ledger–security …

Automatically analyzing information flow within Android applications that rely on
cryptographic operations with their computational security guarantees imposes formidable …

In this thesis we present two new type systems for verifying the security of cryptographic
protocol models expressed in a spi-calculus and, respectively, of protocol implementations …

This thesis presents an epistemic logic for modeling Zero-Knowledge proofs and other
cryptographic protocols. We consider multi-agent interactions where a prover convinces a …

In this thesis, we present novel methods for verifying, implementing and specifying protocols.
In particular, we focus properties modeling data protection and the protection of privacy. In …

Cryptographic protocols can be used to harden the security of IT systems, but only if these
protocols are carefully woven into the system. Thus, a security analysis of the overall system …

The privacy of users has rapidly become one of the most pervasive and stringent
requirements in distributed computing. Designing and implementing privacy-preserving …