When and how do governments deliver public goods and services in response to citizen
preferences? We review the current literature on government responsiveness, with a focus …

We explore the consequences of populism for bureaucrats' incentives by analyzing a model
of delegated policymaking between politicians and bureaucrats. Populist politicians prefer a …

Formal presidential authority does not always translate into real influence over policy
outcomes: The bureaucratic actors actually responsible for policy implementation have …

In many theories of electoral accountability, voters learn about an incumbent's quality by
observing public goods outcomes. But empirical findings are mixed, suggesting that …

We develop a model of policy making with an endogenous bureaucracy. Parties choose
platforms and ideologically differentiated citizens decide whether to enter the public sector …

We explore the consequences of populism for bureaucrats' incentives by analyzing a model
of delegated policy-making between politicians and bureaucrats. Populist leaders prefer …

Theories of political accountability typically focus on voter-politician relationships. However,
overall government performance depends on both elected politicians and unelected …

This paper examines the impact of bureaucracy on policy implementation in environments
where electoral incentives generate pandering. A two-period model is developed to analyze …

Theories of political accountability typically focus on voter-politician relationships. However,
overall government performance depends on both elected politicians and unelected …

We examine the endogenous development of political capital and its use within a model of
electoral accountability. The opposition party can use political capital to impede the …