This paper studies delegation as an alternative to communication. We show that a principal
prefers to delegate control to a better informed agent rather than to communicate with this …

I study a model of strategic communication between an uninformed Receiver and an
informed but upwardly biased Sender. The Sender bears a cost of lying, or more broadly, of …

Public information in financial markets often arrives through the disclosures of interested
parties who have a material interest in the reactions of the market to the new information …

Signaling games refer narrowly to a class of twoplayer games of incomplete information in
which one player is informed and the other is not. The informed player's strategy set consists …

We consider situations in which every agent would like to take an action that is coordinated
with those of others, as well as close to a common state of nature, with the ideal proximity to …

How should a dispute be settled between two opposing parties? The adversarial procedure
invites the parties to make their cases to an impartial arbitrator, while the inquisitorial …

How do multiple attributes of a product jointly determine a seller's disclosure incentives? I
model a monopolist whose product is characterized by vertical quality and a horizontal …

This paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure
theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information to voluntarily …

An agent advises a principal on selecting one of multiple projects or an outside option. The
agent is privately informed about the projects' benefits and shares the principal's …

This paper addresses how hard evidence can be incorporated into mechanism-design
analysis. Two classes of models are compared:(a) ones in which evidentiary decisions are …