One of the most challenging aspects in computer-supported voting is to combine the
apparently conflicting requirements of privacy and verifiability. On the one hand, privacy …

Many cryptographic tasks and protocols, such as non-repudiation, contract-signing, voting,
auction, identity-based encryption, and certain forms of secure multi-party computation …

There have been intensive research efforts in the last two decades or so to design and
deploy electronic voting (e-voting) protocols/systems which allow voters and/or external …

We present a formal, symbolic definition of election verifiability for electronic voting protocols
in the context of the applied pi calculus. Our definition is given in terms of boolean tests …

We present the cryptographic implementation of “DEMOS”, a new e-voting system that is end-
to-end verifiable in the standard model, ie, without any additional “setup” assumption or …

We propose a new voting scheme, BeleniosRF, that offers both receipt-freeness and end-to-
end verifiability. It is receipt-free in a strong sense, meaning that even dishonest voters …

Vote privacy is a fundamental right, which needs to be protected not only during an election,
or for a limited time afterwards, but for the foreseeable future. Numerous electronic voting (e …

Recent results show that the current implementation of Helios, a practical e-voting protocol,
does not ensure independence of the cast votes, and demonstrate the impact of this lack of …

Coercion resistance is one of the most important and intricate security requirements for
voting protocols. Several definitions of coercion resistance have been proposed in the …

For most elections, receipt-freeness is important–voters are unable to prove to others on
how they voted, in order to prevent vote-buying. Many existing receipt-free electronic voting …