We study voting rules for participatory budgeting, where a group of voters collectively
decides which projects should be funded using a common budget. We allow the projects to …

The ability to measure the satisfaction of (groups of) voters is a crucial prerequisite for
formulating proportionality axioms in approval-based participatory budgeting elections. Two …

When selecting a subset of candidates (a so-called committee) based on the preferences of
voters, proportional representation is often a major desideratum. When going beyond …

A voting rule decides on a probability distribution over a set of m alternatives, based on
rankings of those alternatives provided by agents. We assume that agents have cardinal …

Designing and implementing explainable systems is seen as the next step towards
increasing user trust in, acceptance of and reliance on Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems …

We extend the recently introduced framework of metric distortion to multiwinner voting. In this
framework, n agents and m alternatives are located in an underlying metric space. The exact …

We consider a voting model, where a number of candidates need to be selected subject to
certain feasibility constraints. The model generalizes committee elections (where there is a …

Group decision making is an important, long‐standing, and ubiquitous problem in all
societies, where collective decisions must be made by a group of agents despite individual …

We contribute to the programme of lifting proportionality axioms from the multi-winner voting
setting to participatory budgeting. We define novel proportionality axioms for participatory …

We consider the participatory budgeting problem where each of n voters specifies additive
utilities over m candidate projects with given sizes, and the goal is to choose a subset of …