We study the budget aggregation problem in which a set of strategic voters must split a finite
divisible resource (such as money or time) among a set of competing projects. Our goal is …

We study a participatory budgeting problem, where a set of strategic agents wish to split a
divisible budget among different projects, by aggregating their proposals on a single …

In the obnoxious facility location problem (OFLP), some undesirable facility such as a
garbage dump or an oil refinery is to be located on a unit interval (ie the domain of locations …

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems
including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we …

Facility location games provide an abstract model of mechanism design. In such games, a
mechanism takes a profile of n single-peaked preferences over an interval as an input and …

We study the problem of aggregating distributions, such as budget proposals, into a
collective distribution. An ideal aggregation mechanism would be Pareto efficient …

We study the facility location problems (FLPs) with altruistic agents who act to benefit others
in their affiliated groups. Our aim is to design mechanisms that elicit true locations from the …

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility
location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional …

We study the classic facility location setting, where we are given n clients and m possible
facility locations in some arbitrary metric space, and want to choose a location to build a …

An important feature of many real world facility location problems are capacity limits on the
facilities. We show here how capacity constraints make it harder to design strategy proof …