There is a vast literature which conceives Approval Voting as a mechanism where the
approval of voters is a mere strategic action with no intrinsic meaning. As usual, a group of …

Many binary collective choice situations can be described as weighted simple voting games.
We introduce weighted committee games to model decisions on an arbitrary number of …

Abstract By the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem, every reasonable voting rule for three or
more alternatives is susceptible to manipulation: there exist elections where one or more …

In this study, we focus on the quality of Condorcet and Approval Voting winners using
Median and Maximum Coverage problems as benchmarks. We assess the quality of …

This paper reports on the results of a series of experimental laboratory elections. The novelty
of the design allows me to study the extent to which voting methods defeat the Condorcet …

As the relationship between physicians and patients faces increasing challenges, physician–
patient relation has gradually become the common concern of the whole society. To relieve …

The paper considers two-person bargaining under Approval Voting. It first proves the
existence of pure strategy equilibria. Then it shows that this bargaining method ensures that …

In this paper, I study elections where voters are strategic. I find that the commonly used
voting rules, such as Plurality Rule, Majority Rule, Approval Voting, and Single Transferable …

Weak undominance is a standard refinement in the voting literature. This work characterizes
the set of weakly undominated voting strategies in scoring rule elections. Scoring rules are …

Abstract The Chairman Paradox (Farquharson, 1969) is a classical observation in voting
games showing that a Chairman endowed with tie-breaking power might end up with her …