This article was prepared for an invited session at the 2015 World Congress of the
Econometric Society. Through a unifying framework, I survey recent developments in the …

We examine a model of dynamic screening and price discrimination in which the seller has
limited commitment power. Two cohorts of anonymous, patient, and risk-neutral buyers …

Abstract The Introduction to the Symposium Issue on “Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism
Design” of the Journal of Economic Theory provides an overview of the dynamic mechanism …

This paper studies a voluntary overbooking model under rational expectation equilibrium to
promote cooperation between customers and airlines, maintain goodwill of customers, and …

We consider optimal pricing policies for airlines when passengers are uncertain at the time
of ticketing of their eventual willingness to pay for air travel. Auctions at the time of departure …

A seller with commitment power sets prices over time. Risk-averse buyers arrive to the
market and decide when to purchase. We obtain that the optimal price path is a" regular" …

Consider a second-price auction with costly bidding in which bidders with iid private values
have multiple opportunities to bid. If bids are observable, the resulting dynamic-bidding …

This study considers a mechanism design problem in which service slots are allocated over
time to buyers arriving in different periods. Buyers have a multidimensional type …

This paper considers a dynamic mechanism design in which multiple objects with different
consumption deadlines are allocated over time. Agents arrive over time and may have multi …

Consider a second-price auction with costly bidding in which bidders with iid private values
have multiple opportunities to bid. If bids are publicly observable, the resulting dynamic …