We model an OTC market in which informed customers and liquidity customers trade
bilaterally and non-anonymously with dealers who know the types of their customers …

We study the observability of investors' information-acquisition activities in financial markets.
Improving observability leads to two strategic effects on information acquisition:(1) the …

In most over-the-counter markets, a few dealers build large research teams and account for
major proportions of customer trades. We endogenize dealer expertise and size in a model …

Insider trading should not be left unregulated: it should be either subject to mandatory
disclosure or banned altogether. As the costs to collect and process information drop …

We study the interplay between information acquisition and signaling. A sender decides
whether to learn his type at a cost prior to taking a signaling action. A receiver observes the …

Contrary to the prediction of the classic adverse selection theory, a more informed trader
could receive better pricing relative to a less informed trader in over‑the‑counter financial …

We examine an analyst with career concerns making cheap talk recommendations to a
sequence of traders, each of whom possesses private information concerning the analyst's …

This paper examines a signaling game with endogenous types in which the sender can
influence the property of his private information. We propose an equilibrium selection …

We examine an analyst with career concerns making cheap talk recommendations to a
sequence of traders, each of whom possesses private information concerning the analyst's …

Do asset prices aggregate investors' private information about the ability of financial
analysts? We show that as financial analysts become reputable, the market can get trapped …