We survey a recent and growing literature on markets for information. We offer a
comprehensive view of information markets through an integrated model of consumers …

When a user shares her data with online platforms, she reveals information about others. In
such a setting, externalities depress the price of data because once a user's information is …

When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We consider a
symmetric information model where a sender chooses a signal to reveal to a receiver, who …

What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize
themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be …

We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and
chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment …

We study mechanism design in dynamic quasilinear environments where private information
arrives over time and decisions are made over multiple periods. We make three …

The increasingly tight coupling between humans and system operations in domains ranging
from intelligent infrastructure to e-commerce has led to a challenging new class of problems …

A data buyer faces a decision problem under uncertainty. He can augment his initial private
information with supplemental data from a data seller. His willingness to pay for …

A sender randomly draws a “prospect” characterized by its profitability to the sender and its
relevance to a receiver. The receiver observes only a signal provided by the sender and …

We consider an oligopoly model in which consumers engage in sequential search based on
partial product information and advertised prices. By applying Weitzman's (1979) optimal …