To believe something, as contemporary analytic philosophers generally use the term
“belief,” is to take it to be the case or regard it as true. In this sense, many of our beliefs are …

Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what makes something a mental
state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it …

It is plausible that there is a distinctively epistemic standard of correctness for belief. It is also
plausible that there is a range of practical reasons bearing on belief. These theses are often …

Normativism in the theory of meaning and content is the view that linguistic meaning and/or
intentional content are essentially normative. As both normativity and its essentiality to …

Belief, some say, is normative. To say this is to say, not only that beliefs are subject to
normative standards or principles, but that it is part of the essence of belief to be subject to …

I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise
their beliefs in response to relevant counter‐evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their …

The core of Zimmerman's picture posits an inverse correlation between an action's
automaticity and belief's role in the action's execution. This proposal faces serious problems …

Talk about knowledge (or fact) resistance is becoming increasingly common. A whole host of
more or less related phenomena are labelled as such not only in research contexts, but also …

This paper argues for the normative significance of attention. Attention plays an important
role when describing an individual's mind and agency, and in explaining many central facts …

Many of our beliefs behave irrationally: this is hardly news to anyone. Although beliefs'
irrational tendencies need to be taken into account, this paper argues that beliefs …