The Boston mechanism is a popular student-placement mechanism in school-choice
programs around the world. We provide two characterizations of the Boston mechanism. We …

School districts in the United States and around the world are increasingly moving away
from traditional neighborhood school assignment, in which pupils attend closest schools to …

Many school districts in the US assign students to schools via the Boston mechanism. The
Boston mechanism is not strategy-proof, and it is easy to manipulate. We slightly modify the …

Which mechanism to use to allocate school seats to students still remains a question of hot
debate. Meanwhile, immediate acceptance mechanisms remain popular in many school …

School authorities in the UK and the US advocate the use of lotteries to desegregate
schools. We study a school choice mechanism employed in Berlin where a lottery quota is …

We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents based on
agents' preferences over objects and objects'“choice functions” over agents, when monetary …

In a school choice problem, we say that a mechanism is harmless if no student can ever
misreport his preferences so that he is not hurt but someone else is. We consider two large …

We introduce and study a large family of rules for many-to-one matching problems, the
Preference Rank Partitioned (PRP) rules. PRP rules are student-proposing Deferred …

School assignment procedures aim to improve student welfare, but must balance efficiency
and equity goals and provide incentives for students to report their preferences truthfully …

In the matching with contracts setting, we provide new axiomatic characterizations of the
“cumulative offer process”(COP COP) in the domain of hospital choice functions that satisfy …