We examine the incentives that owners of competing firms give their managers. We show that, in equilibrium, each manager will be paid in excess of his decision's marginal profit in a …
T Ko, J Lee, D Ryu - Sustainability, 2018 - mdpi.com
Blockchain technology has been recommended for the sustainability in the manufacturing industry, owing to its benefits in terms of real-time transparency and cost savings. To verify …
This book presents a theory of the firm based on its economic role as an intermediary between customers and suppliers. Professor Spulber demonstrates how the intermediation …
Die Neuauflage berücksichtigt die Umstellung der Diplomstudiengänge auf Bachelor und Master, so daß das Buch sowohl für Bachelor-Einführungsveranstaltungen als auch für …
This study considers consumers' environmental awareness (CEA) and examines firms' managerial delegation contracts between sales and environmental performance incentives …
The Theory of the Firm presents a path-breaking general framework for understanding the economics of the firm. The book addresses why firms exist, how firms are established, and …
F Lafontaine, ME Slade - The Journal of Industrial Economics, 1997 - Wiley Online Library
We summarize a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on contractual relationships between manufacturers and their exclusive resellers. We do this using studies …
The role of commitments in noncooperative games is well acknowledged and documented. One way to achieve commitments is by letting delegates represent the players of a game. In …
T Jansen, A van Lier, A van Witteloostuijn - International Journal of …, 2007 - Elsevier
We consider a two-stage market share delegation game with two competing firms. Each owner delegates the production decision to a manager. Each manager's remuneration is a …