In party-approval multiwinner elections the goal is to allocate the seats of a fixed-size
committee to parties based on the approval ballots of the voters over the parties. In …

Maximal lottery (ML) schemes constitute an interesting class of randomized voting rules that
were proposed by Peter Fishburn in 1984 and have been repeatedly recommended for …

Judgment aggregation (JA) offers a generic formal framework for modeling various set-tings
involving information aggregation by social choice mechanisms. For many judgment …

Approval voting allows every voter to cast a ballot of approved alternatives and chooses the
alternatives with the largest number of approvals. Due to its simplicity and superior …

Gibbard and Satterthwaite have shown that the only single‐valued social choice functions
(SCFs) that satisfy nonimposition (ie, the function's range coincides with its codomain) and …

Social choice functions (SCFs) map the preferences of a group of agents over some set of
alternatives to a non-empty subset of alternatives. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem has …

A voting rule is a Condorcet extension if it returns a candidate that beats every other
candidate in pairwise majority comparisons whenever one exists. Condorcet extensions …

By relaxing the dominating set in three ways (eg, from" each member beats every non-
member" to" each member beats or ties every non-member, with an additional requirement …

An important--but very demanding--property in collective decision-making is
strategyproofness, which requires that voters cannot benefit from submitting insincere …