This paper adapts the exponential/Poisson bandits framework to a model of reputation
concerns. The result is a dynamic signalling game with changing types. We study a decision …

This article studies costly signaling. The signaling effort is chosen in multiple periods and
observed with noise. The signaler benefits from the belief of the market, not directly from the …

We study the interplay between information acquisition and signaling. A sender decides
whether to learn his type at a cost prior to taking a signaling action. A receiver observes the …

This paper characterizes informational outcomes in a model of dynamic signaling with
vanishing commitment power. It shows that contrary to popular belief, informative equilibria …

This paper analyzes repeated bargaining in a market where a buyer purchases goods from
different sellers over time. A buyer with private information about his purchasing power …

This paper studies repeated costly signalling when luck matters for the outcome. Benefit is
obtained from the belief of the market, not directly from the effort or the signal. Nonstationary …

This paper studies repeated costly signalling when luck matters for the outcome. Benefit is
obtained from the belief of the receivers, not directly from the effort or the signal …

労働市場は, その取引対象となる労働サービスの品質に関して, 取引 (雇用) に先だって,
買い手である雇用主側に正しい情報が伝わりにくいという問題がある. この様な問題は現在 …