I study intermediation via sequential bilateral bargaining in markets with a network structure.
A partition of the network into layers captures intermediation power. Competition governs …

This article investigates the sequencing choice of a buyer who negotiates with the sellers of
two complementary objects with uncertain payoffs. The possibility of inefficient trade may …

We consider the issue of designing Bayesian incentive-compatible, efficient, individually
rational and balanced mechanisms for Land Acquisition. This is a problem of great practical …

We study intermediation in markets with an underlying network structure. A good is resold
via successive bilateral bargaining between linked intermediaries until it reaches one of …

To enact a policy, a leader needs votes from q committee members with heterogeneous
opposition intensities. She sequentially offers transfers in exchange for votes. The transfers …

Complementarity is common in land-assembly problems, such as a developer buying the
entirety of apartment units to complete a development project. Holdout (delay or block of …

We report an experiment designed to study bargaining behavior between one buyer and
multiple sellers with complementarity and how it is influenced by fairness concern and …

We study a model in which heterogeneous agents first form a trading network where linking
costs are positive but infinitesimally small. Then, a seller and a buyer are randomly selected …

Developers seeking to assemble complementary parcels of land will likely encounter
strategic behavior by landowners. Using a property‐level data set from Florida's Department …

In bilateral negotiations between a principal and two agents, we show that the agents'
bargaining strengths are crucial for the determination of the bargaining sequence and the …