Some advances in cooperative game theory: Indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach

Y Funaki, M Núñez - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2024 - Elsevier
This article reviews some contributions on cooperative games where the Journal of
Mathematical Economics has been influential, namely the games with non-transferable …

Generating empirical core size distributions of hedonic games using a Monte Carlo Method

AJ Collins, S Etemadidavan… - International Game Theory …, 2022 - World Scientific
Hedonic games have gained popularity over the last two decades, leading to several
research articles that have used analytical methods to understand their properties better. In …

A comparison of NTU values in a cooperative game with incomplete information

A Salamanca - Journal of Mechanism and Institution …, 2019 - portal.findresearcher.sdu.dk
Several" value-like" solution concepts are computed and compared in a cooperative game
with incomplete information and non-transferable utility. We will show that the difference …

Conditional Random Dictatorship and the Value of a Bayesian Cooperative Game

A Salamanca - Available at SSRN 4375032, 2023 - papers.ssrn.com
We present and analyze a theory of cooperative bargaining under asymmetric information,
based on the equity principles of the conditional random dictatorship—choosing with equal …

On the values of Bayesian cooperative games with sidepayments

A Salamanca - Mathematical Social Sciences, 2020 - Elsevier
In this paper, we study the solution concept of value in transferable utility (TU) games with
asymmetric information. In our model contingent contracts are required to be incentive …

Incentives in Cooperation and Communication

AS Lugo - 2017 - hal.science
This dissertation consists of three self-contained papers in which we analyze cooperation
and strategic information transmission in situations of asymmetric information where …

Random Dictatorship and the Value in Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information

S Lugo - 2017 - iris.unive.it
In this paper we define a bargaining solution for cooperative games with incomplete
information. Our solution concept is inspired in Myerson's [Mechanism design by an …