Why do international institutions vary so widely in terms of such key institutional features as
membership, scope, and flexibility? We argue that international actors are goal-seeking …

This review of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with
presentation of the seminal Baron-Ferejohn model. The review then encompasses the …

Every year, states negotiate, conclude, sign, and give effect to hundreds of new international
agreements. Koremenos argues that the detailed design provisions of such agreements …

Trades of money for political influence persist at every level of government. Not surprisingly,
governments themselves trade money for political support on the international stage …

I examine if and how a superpower can use its asymmetric power to achieve favorable
outcomes in multilateral bargaining between states that have conflicting interests and veto …

We provide a general theory of collective decision making, one that relates social choices to
the strategic incentives of individuals, by generalizing the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model of …

Harsanyi (1974) criticized the von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM) stable set for its
presumption that coalitions are myopic about their prospects. He proposed a new …

Over the last two decades a large and important literature has emerged that uses game
theoretic models of bargaining to study legislative coalitions. To test key predictions of these …

Organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting. We analyze this setting
using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model …

“A major piece of work... a classic. There is no other book like it.”—Norman Schofield,
Washington University “The authors succeed brilliantly in tackling a large number of …