Basic law and economics explains that, as with other forms of public law enforcement, anti-
cartel enforcement increases social welfare if the social gain from detecting and deterring …

We address the growing concern that minority shareholding (MS) in rival firms may lessen
competition, using the introduction of national leniency programs (LPs) as a shock that …

Competition authorities need a better understanding of the determinants of cartel self-
reporting in order to increase cartel members' incentives to apply for the benefit from …

This special issue marks the 25th anniversary of the introduction of a leniency program for
antitrust in the EU and contains five original papers: Each paper examines the effects of …

This insightful book considers the phenomenon of the transformation of enforcement in
European economic law while adopting a distinct global perspective. The editors identify …

We provide a comprehensive quantitative assessment of cartels and the related cartel
enforcement process in the European Union (EU) from 2001 to 2015. In a first step, we …

The objective of this study is to empirically assess whether the 2002 reform of the EU
leniency program, which brought the EU leniency policy much closer to the US policy, has …

Fine reductions for self-reported offenses entail a potential trade-off. On the one hand,
inducing offenders to self-report allows the social planner to save on enforcement costs and …

Cartels remain widespread and constitute a major problem for society. Leniency policies
reduce or cancel the sanctions for the first firm (s) that self-report being part of a cartel and …

A cartel is an anti-competitive market behavior that agreements between competitors to
prevent, restrict or distort competition. From 2012 until 2017, the number of cases handled …