Competitive situations resembling contests are ubiquitous in modern economic landscape.
In a contest, economic agents expend costly effort to vie for limited prizes, and they are …

We examine optimal information disclosure through Bayesian persuasion in a two‐player
contest. One contestant's valuation is commonly known and the other's is his private …

In winner‐take‐all tournaments, agents' performance is determined jointly by effort and luck,
and the top performer is rewarded. We study the impact of the “shape of luck”—the details of …

In this paper, we study information disclosure policies in all‐pay auctions with incomplete
information. Two symmetric players have either high or low private value. The contest …

This paper studies the effort-maximizing design of a complete-information contest with
endogenous entry. A fixed pool of homogenous potential players with identical marginal …

We use a laboratory experiment to study the effects of disclosing the number of active
participants in contests with endogenous entry. At the first stage, potential participants …

In many contest situations, the number of participants is not observable at the time of
investment. We design a laboratory experiment to study individual behavior in Tullock …

Following a Bayesian persuasion approach, we establish that full disclosure (resp.
concealment) is the contest organizer's effort-maximizing policy for disclosing the number of …

Considered are imperfectly discriminating contests in which players may possess private
information about the primitives of the game, such as the contest technology, valuations of …

A contestant's effort depends on her knowledge of her rival's type. This knowledge is often
limited in real-life contests. We propose a model where the principal of a contest has …